Energy Policy: After the Darkness in the National Assembly, Will the Lights Come Back On?

PPE: A Recap of the Facts

Background

Amid the confusion in the nearly empty chamber of the National Assembly, the bill known as the “Grémillet Bill” was extensively amended and ultimately rejected in late June 2025, before moving on to the Senate in early July. On the sidelines of the European Council meeting on June 26, President Macron appeared to make France’s commitment to the European targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2040 (a 90% reduction compared to 1990 levels) contingent on a more balanced approach to nuclear power relative to renewable energy. At the same time, the publication of the report on the causes of the Spanish blackout will not change the minds of commentators who are already convinced: in their view, renewable energy is to blame, costly, unnecessary, and dangerous for the grid.

There is no shortage of energy-related news, but the concepts and issues can sometimes seem unclear and unprioritized to certain stakeholders. Energy policy cannot be based on an ideological framework. Let’s review a few facts, focusing on the period from 2025 to 2035.

France is currently experiencing an “oversupply” of electricity, and that’s actually good news

Since 1980, this has almost always been the case. Between 2010 and 2021, France had an average net electricity export balance of 55 TWh per year. 2022 was an exceptional year due to the energy crisis linked to the war in Ukraine, a shortfall in hydroelectric generation, stress corrosion issues affecting about ten nuclear reactors, and a more heavily scheduled maintenance program for the nuclear fleet—a legacy of decisions made during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, France became a net importer (-17 TWh). It was a difficult year, but things are expected to return to normal as early as 2023 with a net export surplus of 50 TWh, and even a historic record in 2024 of approximately 90 TWh.^[1].

This “surplus” (more exports than imports) is good news for France and Europe:

• It is helping to bring prices down; by 2024, prices had returned to levels close to their pre-crisis historical averages, confirming the downward trend that began in 2023^[2] ;
• It generates a trade surplus for France: 4 billion euros in 2024^[3] ;
• Since our electricity is low-carbon, exports help reduce greenhouse gas emissions by preventing our neighbors from operating their fossil-fuel power plants^[4].

Even though electricity is a unique commodity, when France exports cars or wine, “overproduction” is not viewed negatively.

2024 is certainly a record year, but we need to think long-term. Not all years are the same. Who can predict what the impact of the next climate-geopolitical crisis will be? It’s better to be safe than sorry.

To go into more detail, this “overproduction” is also characterized by times of day when production exceeds demand. Typically, when solar panels are generating massive amounts of power in France and in neighboring countries, prices on the spot market (which only partially influence the prices of supply contracts) turn negative. This trend is accelerating: in the first half of 2025, there were 32% more hours with negative prices than during the same period in 2024.^[5]. In May, 90% of the days had negative or zero prices, with an average price for the month of 19 €/MWh^[6].

But is that really a problem? It means we need to learn how to manage this abundant, very inexpensive energy. There are many solutions for making better use of it, while maintaining viable business models for producers: increasing the number of off-peak hours during the day to encourage flexibility and better management of energy consumption^[7], amend the standard contracts for state-supported facilities^[8], increase certain types of energy consumption (hydrogen production, battery charging), etc.

Finally, these negative prices are forcing nuclear power plants to “modulate” (reduce their output) to make way for renewables, due to a lack of economic opportunities. Currently at around 1–2 TWh, RTE forecasts an increase in these periods “imposed” on the nuclear fleet by 2035, to around 15 TWh (<4% of nuclear production).^[9]. Since these costs are primarily fixed (construction depreciation, salaries), this results in a significant financial loss for the nuclear industry. It would make sense to consider a mechanism to balance the coexistence of all low-carbon energy sectors, similar to the solar feed-in tariffs that provide incentives not to generate power under certain conditions.

Increasing electrification would not only help mitigate this overproduction, but also reduce the cost of fossil fuels, create jobs, and make France more independent on the international stage

60% of the energy consumed in France comes from fossil fuels. Beyond the climate challenges, moving away from fossil fuels reduces our energy bills, creates local jobs, and strengthens our energy independence. To achieve this, electrifying our energy use is essential: from about 25% today to more than 50% by 2050^[10]. However, this electrification rate has been stagnating in Europe, unlike in other countries such as China^[11].

In France, between 2010 and 2023, this rate remained stable at around 26–27%. It is therefore urgent to change this trend.^[13].

With regard to renewable electricity generation, it should be noted that onshore and offshore wind power are expanding at a significant pace, though they remain below the country’s own targets^[14].

While there is a gap between objectives and reality, the pace of deployment for these sectors can obviously be adjusted—but in a balanced way, since “stop-and-go” approaches are detrimental to any industrial sector—whether renewable or nuclear—that requires a stable framework for development.

So let’s not get the debate wrong: what we need to focus on is finding ways to accelerate the electrification of end-use applications, not endlessly dwelling on production.

Yes, electricity consumption in France is expected to increase by 2035

Predicting electricity consumption for the coming years is a complicated task. The “Commission of Inquiry on Electricity Production, Consumption, and Prices for 2035 and 2050,” established by the Senate in 2024, has largely called into question the upward projections made by various modeling and forecasting organizations (RTE, ADEME, négaWatt, etc.). Their conclusion^[15] However, it seems very likely that consumption will rise; they, for their part, are projecting 615 TWh in 2035 (compared to 449 TWh in 2024).

RTE, the electricity transmission system operator, is currently best equipped to model the behavior of the power grid based on interconnections, generation and flexibility resources, demand responsiveness, and other factors. The “2035 Forecast Report” presents a wide range of scenarios, allowing for the description of different futures based on technical, political, and societal choices, while also highlighting certain unforeseeable factors in the years ahead.

The electrification of transportation and industry is expected to drive an increase in electricity demand by 2035. Energy efficiency in commercial and residential buildings offsets the electrification of heating systems and the increase in air conditioning (the recent rush to build more data centers has only been partially modeled so far). Depending on the assumptions, the increase ranges from 100 to 200 TWh. Here, an illustrative scenario of +120 TWh is used.

To meet this potential increase in consumption by 2035, renewable energy sources are the only viable option

To meet this additional demand, RTE anticipates that hydropower generation will level off (due to limited remaining potential and anticipated conflicts over water use) and that nuclear power generation will also level off (due to the completion of work related to stress corrosion issues, as well as uncertainties regarding the duration and findings of the decennial inspections). The shortfall will therefore rely on a sharp increase in solar and wind power generation, regardless of the scenario considered—even under optimistic assumptions regarding demand flexibility, interconnections, or nuclear availability.

Thus, the question of which technologies to choose to meet an additional demand of ~120 TWh over 10 years is essentially settled: the deployment of solar and wind power appears to be essential.

The 2040 and 2050 scenarios offer more flexible options (with the commissioning of new nuclear power plants), but given our decarbonization goals, the 2030–2040 decade cannot be spent simply waiting for the arrival of a potential series of EPR 2 reactors.

The need to expand the solar and wind power sectors by 2035 should not overshadow the other components necessary for the operation of an efficient, cost-optimized grid:

• flexibility, particularly on the demand side (load shedding, managing electric vehicle charging);
• state-of-the-art generation technologies that contribute to various reserves or enable storage (pumped-storage hydroelectric plants, batteries, low-carbon thermal sources such as biogas or hydrogen, etc.).

Although these factors are often overlooked, they play an essential role in the short and medium term in ensuring a balance between supply and demand and limiting the costs of grid adaptation (consuming electricity at the same time it is generated, avoiding oversizing, and avoiding load shedding).

Would optimizing production at the existing nuclear power plants make it possible to bridge the gap until the first EPR 2 reactors come online by 2040, without having to install solar and wind power on a massive scale in the meantime?

=> If we do not abandon our decarbonization goals (and thus our electrification goals—an increase of 120 TWh over 10 years), this transition seems impossible.

Optimize installed capacity?

There is room for optimization, but it will not be enough to generate an additional ~120 TWh by 2035.

• Increase the availability rate: The “START” program, launched by EDF, aims to increase operational efficiency and shorten reactor outages for refueling, decennial inspections, or any other maintenance. The year 2024 is yielding its first results: nearly 50% of outages were “rescheduled” ahead of the target date (i.e., without using up all available margins) in 2024, compared with only 17% in 2023.^[16]. These optimizations could result in savings of 3 to 4 TWh/year.
• Increase production at rated capacity: Work has already led to a 5% increase in output at certain 900 MW reactors, and EDF estimates it can gain an additional ~450 MWe^[17] of power, or approximately 3 TWh/year.

Maintain installed capacity?

• The cost of extending the operating life of reactors in the existing nuclear power fleet is estimated to be between 30 and 40 €/MWh^[18], which makes it a competitive solution, if technically feasible.
• The average age of French nuclear reactors is 40 years. More than half of the reactors will have to undergo their 5th and 6th decennial inspections (when the reactors are 50 and 60 years old)^[19]), by 2035 and 2045, respectively^[20]. Even though EDF has prepared them thoroughly, these visits inherently involve a degree of uncertainty.
• There are reasons to be optimistic : EDF and the ASNR learned a great deal and capitalized on that knowledge during the fourth decennial inspections of the 900 MWe power class. Bernard Doroszczuk, who was president of the ASN at the time, stated before a Senate investigative committee^[21] : "Extending the operating life of certain reactors beyond forty years has led to a significant update: the gap addressed during the fourth decennial inspection is not representative of the one that would need to be addressed during the fifth or sixth inspection [...]. Further improvements will still need to be made [...], but these adjustments will be less extensive.”. The fourth decennial inspections of the 1,300 MWe series do not yet provide that perspective.
• Nevertheless, from a risk management perspective, caution is still warranted : The “shortfall in generation” in the event that a reactor’s operating license is not extended is significant: a 900 MWe unit generates an average of 6 TWh per year. It seems necessary to plan for a scenario in which some reactors fail to pass their decennial safety review in order to ensure the grid’s resilience.

Installing wind and solar power capacity is not a financial drain

In the early 2000s, the deployment of the first wind and solar power capacity in France was heavily subsidized by public funds because the technologies were not yet mature or at scale, the industry ecosystems were still underdeveloped, and there were also the costs associated with learning the ropes.

By 2025, the full cost will become competitive, well below that of fossil fuel-based generation, even when costs associated with grid integration are included. In fact, generation sources should not be compared solely on the basis of their production costs, but also in terms of the services they provide to the grid (controllability, frequency maintenance, etc.). The additional costs for variable renewables (solar and wind) increase as their share in the generation mix rises (with growing challenges beyond 85%^[22] - which leaves some room to grow; in 2024, we were at 13%^[23]). In conclusion, when all costs are taken into account, the costs of renewable energy are comparable in magnitude to those of new nuclear power.

Furthermore, some media outlets have reported staggering amounts of public funds earmarked to support variable renewable energy sectors (200 or 300 billion euros—without specifying what this includes or over what time period).

To give you a better idea, here are a few points.

In terms of production costs, the PPE No. 3 draft estimates that between 2025 and 2060, the range of public support for renewable energy production (wind, solar, hydro, biomethane, etc.) to be much lower: between 98 and 135 Md€ in the most pessimistic scenario, and from -33 to -25 Md€ in the most optimistic scenario—that is, between 4 Md€/year and -1 Md€/year depending on the energy price scenarios^[24]. This public investment should be viewed in the context of the annual trade deficit caused by fossil fuel imports^[25], amounting to 58 billion euros in 2024^[26].

Some studies suggest that, at the European level, an increase in solar and wind capacity would have a downward effect on wholesale prices, taking variability into account (taxes and levies imposed by member states may or may not offset this decrease for consumers).^[27]. These developments would also help reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity prices^[28].

Beyond production costs, changes to our electricity system generate costs for the grid, which are borne by consumers through the TURPE (Public Electricity Grid Usage Fee):

• RTE's high-voltage grid: ~100 Md€^[29] investment between 2025 and 2040, 45% of which will be allocated to the integration of renewable energy sources (notably the connection of offshore wind turbines and onshore facilities), but also to adapt the grid to climate change, replace century-old sections, integrate future nuclear reactors, etc.
• Enedis’s medium- and low-voltage grid: ~100 Md€ in investment between 2022 and 2040, of which approximately 20% will be dedicated to connecting renewable energy sources; with the remainder going toward modernization, climate change adaptation, and the installation of electric vehicle charging stations^[30].

It should be noted that there are also other costs, such as government-guaranteed loans for the development of new nuclear power.

In conclusion, be sure to compare like with like (in particular by correctly allocating the share of additional costs associated with renewables), clearly identify who pays for what, and consider the electricity system as a whole (including renewables and nuclear power).

A balanced mix that capitalizes on the advantages of each technology (deployment speed, costs, network services, etc.) helps minimize overall costs and risks, with the goal of freeing us from fossil fuel imports as quickly as possible.

Electricity accounts for only 27% of our energy consumption today and could account for 50% by 2050—so we urgently need to talk about the rest!

Moving away from fossil fuels means not only electrifying but also decarbonizing heat use. In fact, heat accounts for 45% of our final energy consumption and relies on fossil fuels (mostly natural gas) for 75% of that. The nature of these uses is varied (residential heating, district heating for communities, high-temperature industrial processes), as are the solutions for decarbonization.

The long-term potential for low-carbon thermal energy production exceeds ~500 TWh, which is roughly equivalent to our current heat consumption. The public debate would benefit from devoting as much attention to these energy sources as it does to the often fruitless discussions surrounding nuclear power and renewable electricity.

Conclusion

The Multi-Year Energy Plan sets a course for France's energy mix through 2035 and outlines a path toward 2050.

This milestone is the transition away from fossil fuels to address climate challenges, improve our trade balance, and regain our independence on the geopolitical stage.

This goal makes it possible to plan both public and private investments, guide the development of professional sectors, and ensure that the volumes needed for future uses will indeed be available at a competitive price that is acceptable to businesses and households.

With regard to electricity (we must also consider renewable heat), developing new nuclear capacity by 2050—particularly to offset the closures of older reactors—requires that we begin planning specific initiatives today. In the shorter term, accelerating the phase-out of fossil fuels is expected to lead to an increase in our electricity consumption of more than 100 TWh by 2035. To meet this need, only renewable electricity sources—particularly solar and wind power—are credible options: they are competitive, can be deployed quickly, and create jobs in France. Their variable nature requires us to adapt the operation of our grid, but the overall benefits far outweigh the costs.

A planning exercise of this kind, with concrete impacts on all aspects of our lives, can only be approached with seriousness and nuance. At the moment, we are seeing more simplistic arguments—closer to political slogans or symbols than to a genuine, fact-based, methodical, and measured planning process.